By not contesting the 2024 (s)election results and not demanding hand recounts in the seven battleground states (at least), Kamala Harris killed democracy. When we don't fight, we lose.
And that's not even to mention the details of reasons to suspect the 2024 election. No doubt VP Kamala Harris will make a similar confession a few years from now.
Exasperating to watch as a convicted felon who is threatening to destroy America is not seen as a threat to democracy. Trump is NOT a "sitting President," and has NO IMMUNITY. Trump is NOT protected as a "President elect."
Hitler told everyone what he was going to do, but no one believed him.
> VP Harris needs to demand a recount.
>March 2020 - 555,000 Americans died of Covid while Trump did NOTHING for 12 weeks. - Brookings Institute
And what new horrors await us if RFK, JR is confirmed? I think that's a long shot at this point, but seriously, we need a hand recount in all the swing states (you know, the ones that count). 😕
I recall the 2004 election. I went to karaoke shortly thereafter and sang out, screamed out, at the top of my lungs, Megalomaniac by Incubus. I live in Ohio and I knew it was not an accurate election result!
Repugs, since the Tea Party, should not be a party in our elections, they cheat and steal, and never care about their constituents. 💔
And slightly off-topic, if you ran as a Democrat (or any party, really) and decide to switch your party after you're elected, you should be required to vacate your seat for another member of the party you ran on. This is not the will of the voters who elected you!!
The priority should be that of creating a system that is fully auditable, and where any alterations of electronic data are easy to detect via strong audit trails.
Voting should be easy to do, while simultaneously providing a clear audit trail. One that is extremely difficult to compromise. Historically, paper audit trails have been the most secure way to record data. I believe they still are. A touchscreen voting machine should contain a printer to record the voters choices on a 2 part paper roll, with one copy dispensed to allow the voter to instantly verify that the machine recorded their vote properly, and the other copy retained internally, on a receiving roll. The printer should also keep an electronic record separate from the record in the touchscreen system, for real time instant audits. But the paper roll remains as the user verified, auditable backup. Spot audits could be performed, with any difference between the separate electronic counts and/or the paper roll, throwing up a red flag, and alerting officials that something has gone wrong. Existing touch screen voting systems would just need to have a receipt printing module attached, and new machines could be made with the printer built in.
I would contend that the user verification is what was lacking in previous systems. Even punch card systems or hand marked balloting could have provided a user verification booth, where voters could insert their ballot, and see on a display how their vote would be tallied. This would have prevented or ameliorated almost every problem that occurred in the 2000 election.
A combination of touchscreen voting with dual electronic tallies, and an accompanying paper record gives you voter verification of their own vote via receipt, and the physical impossibility of an improperly or fraudulently recorded vote, because of the 2 part roll duplication. If a voter perceives an error, it could be easily noted directly on the roll, via an election worker override, and the voter’s erroneous receipt could be deposited inside the voting machine with the roll storage, to be matched for verification in the event of a paper audit.
I think such a system would guard against voter errors or confusion, and could be easily implemented, easily audited, with a fully verifiable recount available via the paper record.
The paper rolls used back then were not 2 part, so no voter verification, and they were haphazardly implemented.
Your objections do not alter or reduce the increased security and error correcting offered by such a system. Paper rolls are not hard to audit, they are instead, time consuming to audit. Initial auditing can be sped up with machine reading, and subsequently verified by human audits. The voter verification allows the roll to act as the final arbiter for any error conditions.
I appreciate your enthusiasm for this idea. It's illegal as far as i know to give voters a paper record of their vote because of the concern that it's will be used for voter coercion.
I am unfamiliar with any legislation making that illegal. Regardless, the paper record could just be used to allow voters to verify their vote, and then returned upon exiting the polling booth or station, removing any possibility of external coercion. The voting machine could have a receipt scanner, and insertion of the receipt, could be used to validate their vote.
Most of the screw-ups in the 2000 election were because voters had no means of verifying how their ballot would be tallied, allowing many mistakes to be made, such as the 'butterfly' ballots in Florida's Palm Beach county.
Leonard if you print one receipt that the voter gets to see, and another receipt that the voter doesn't get the see, you can beat it as a hacker/programmer simply by making the internal printed vote receipt match the internal hacked touch screen vote. And the external printed confirmation receipt will match what the voter intended.
We have to be very careful proposing solutions. We have to test them thoroughly with skilled people who's task it is to test the ease of corrupting the outcome.
Rain, you seem to be completely overlooking my mention of two part, or multipart forms, such as carbonless NCR forms. Printing on such a two part roll produces an identical copy on both layers from one printhead. It would not be possible for the parts to differ. Thus nullifying your whole concept.
For years, the SSA effectively used your SS number as both ID and password, which unfortunately fostered identity theft. This is still a legacy problem, making it anything but safe and private.
Plus SSA is a federal agency, and voting is a state function.
By not contesting the 2024 (s)election results and not demanding hand recounts in the seven battleground states (at least), Kamala Harris killed democracy. When we don't fight, we lose.
And that's not even to mention the details of reasons to suspect the 2024 election. No doubt VP Kamala Harris will make a similar confession a few years from now.
One recount in North Carolina will justify every issue to recount every Swing State.
Exasperating to watch as a convicted felon who is threatening to destroy America is not seen as a threat to democracy. Trump is NOT a "sitting President," and has NO IMMUNITY. Trump is NOT protected as a "President elect."
Hitler told everyone what he was going to do, but no one believed him.
> VP Harris needs to demand a recount.
>March 2020 - 555,000 Americans died of Covid while Trump did NOTHING for 12 weeks. - Brookings Institute
Sigh...
🗽🇺🇲🇺🇦
And what new horrors await us if RFK, JR is confirmed? I think that's a long shot at this point, but seriously, we need a hand recount in all the swing states (you know, the ones that count). 😕
I recall the 2004 election. I went to karaoke shortly thereafter and sang out, screamed out, at the top of my lungs, Megalomaniac by Incubus. I live in Ohio and I knew it was not an accurate election result!
Repugs, since the Tea Party, should not be a party in our elections, they cheat and steal, and never care about their constituents. 💔
And slightly off-topic, if you ran as a Democrat (or any party, really) and decide to switch your party after you're elected, you should be required to vacate your seat for another member of the party you ran on. This is not the will of the voters who elected you!!
Could Marianne Willliams ask for a recount? Could a write-in candidate ask for one?
The priority should be that of creating a system that is fully auditable, and where any alterations of electronic data are easy to detect via strong audit trails.
Voting should be easy to do, while simultaneously providing a clear audit trail. One that is extremely difficult to compromise. Historically, paper audit trails have been the most secure way to record data. I believe they still are. A touchscreen voting machine should contain a printer to record the voters choices on a 2 part paper roll, with one copy dispensed to allow the voter to instantly verify that the machine recorded their vote properly, and the other copy retained internally, on a receiving roll. The printer should also keep an electronic record separate from the record in the touchscreen system, for real time instant audits. But the paper roll remains as the user verified, auditable backup. Spot audits could be performed, with any difference between the separate electronic counts and/or the paper roll, throwing up a red flag, and alerting officials that something has gone wrong. Existing touch screen voting systems would just need to have a receipt printing module attached, and new machines could be made with the printer built in.
I would contend that the user verification is what was lacking in previous systems. Even punch card systems or hand marked balloting could have provided a user verification booth, where voters could insert their ballot, and see on a display how their vote would be tallied. This would have prevented or ameliorated almost every problem that occurred in the 2000 election.
A combination of touchscreen voting with dual electronic tallies, and an accompanying paper record gives you voter verification of their own vote via receipt, and the physical impossibility of an improperly or fraudulently recorded vote, because of the 2 part roll duplication. If a voter perceives an error, it could be easily noted directly on the roll, via an election worker override, and the voter’s erroneous receipt could be deposited inside the voting machine with the roll storage, to be matched for verification in the event of a paper audit.
I think such a system would guard against voter errors or confusion, and could be easily implemented, easily audited, with a fully verifiable recount available via the paper record.
Paper rolls attached to voting machines were tried in the early 2000s. They are very hard to audit.
Also it's problematic to have 2 versions of the official vote because of they differ you don't know which one is correct
The paper rolls used back then were not 2 part, so no voter verification, and they were haphazardly implemented.
Your objections do not alter or reduce the increased security and error correcting offered by such a system. Paper rolls are not hard to audit, they are instead, time consuming to audit. Initial auditing can be sped up with machine reading, and subsequently verified by human audits. The voter verification allows the roll to act as the final arbiter for any error conditions.
I appreciate your enthusiasm for this idea. It's illegal as far as i know to give voters a paper record of their vote because of the concern that it's will be used for voter coercion.
I am unfamiliar with any legislation making that illegal. Regardless, the paper record could just be used to allow voters to verify their vote, and then returned upon exiting the polling booth or station, removing any possibility of external coercion. The voting machine could have a receipt scanner, and insertion of the receipt, could be used to validate their vote.
Most of the screw-ups in the 2000 election were because voters had no means of verifying how their ballot would be tallied, allowing many mistakes to be made, such as the 'butterfly' ballots in Florida's Palm Beach county.
Any more objections?
Leonard if you print one receipt that the voter gets to see, and another receipt that the voter doesn't get the see, you can beat it as a hacker/programmer simply by making the internal printed vote receipt match the internal hacked touch screen vote. And the external printed confirmation receipt will match what the voter intended.
We have to be very careful proposing solutions. We have to test them thoroughly with skilled people who's task it is to test the ease of corrupting the outcome.
Rain, you seem to be completely overlooking my mention of two part, or multipart forms, such as carbonless NCR forms. Printing on such a two part roll produces an identical copy on both layers from one printhead. It would not be possible for the parts to differ. Thus nullifying your whole concept.
A reasonable option
Voting through the Social Security's network would be safe and private. It would also bolster the need to keep it solvent.
For years, the SSA effectively used your SS number as both ID and password, which unfortunately fostered identity theft. This is still a legacy problem, making it anything but safe and private.
Plus SSA is a federal agency, and voting is a state function.
So there is literally no safe way to vote. The system we have has been corrupted for decades.
You appear to have concluded that out of thin air.
Prove me wrong...dare you. Choose your poison, hanging Chad's or counting jelly beans in a jar.
You're the guest. Prove yourself right first.