Leonard if you print one receipt that the voter gets to see, and another receipt that the voter doesn't get the see, you can beat it as a hacker/programmer simply by making the internal printed vote receipt match the internal hacked touch screen vote. And the external printed confirmation receipt will match what the voter intended.
Leonard if you print one receipt that the voter gets to see, and another receipt that the voter doesn't get the see, you can beat it as a hacker/programmer simply by making the internal printed vote receipt match the internal hacked touch screen vote. And the external printed confirmation receipt will match what the voter intended.
We have to be very careful proposing solutions. We have to test them thoroughly with skilled people who's task it is to test the ease of corrupting the outcome.
Rain, you seem to be completely overlooking my mention of two part, or multipart forms, such as carbonless NCR forms. Printing on such a two part roll produces an identical copy on both layers from one printhead. It would not be possible for the parts to differ. Thus nullifying your whole concept.
Leonard if you print one receipt that the voter gets to see, and another receipt that the voter doesn't get the see, you can beat it as a hacker/programmer simply by making the internal printed vote receipt match the internal hacked touch screen vote. And the external printed confirmation receipt will match what the voter intended.
We have to be very careful proposing solutions. We have to test them thoroughly with skilled people who's task it is to test the ease of corrupting the outcome.
Rain, you seem to be completely overlooking my mention of two part, or multipart forms, such as carbonless NCR forms. Printing on such a two part roll produces an identical copy on both layers from one printhead. It would not be possible for the parts to differ. Thus nullifying your whole concept.